Japan must wean itself off the U.S.
 
Peter Rutland IHT
Wednesday, July 21, 2004
Ties that bind
 
TOKYO Some Pentagon wag once said "the U.S. makes dinner and NATO washes the dishes." Presumably, all he would expect of Japan is to pick up the tab.
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To say that Japan is taken for granted by the United States is an understatement. Japan is locked into a security dependency on the United States that was forged in 1945. Most Japanese policy makers seem happy with a subordinate role, or at least resigned to it, in the absence of any obvious alternative.
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Speakers at a symposium last spring on U.S.-Japanese relations competed to affirm the uniqueness of the "special relationship." Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone proudly described Japan as an unsinkable aircraft carrier for the United States.
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Since the first Gulf War, when Japan contributed $13 billion to the war costs, Tokyo has cautiously increased its contributions to international peacekeeping operations. Currently, 640 Self Defense Force (SDF) troops are in Samawah, in southern Iraq, ostensibly for construction projects. Their presence is symbolic - but symbolic of what? It shows Japan's loyalty to the United States, but also starkly demonstrates the limits of that relationship.
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The United States wants Japan to take more responsibility for its own defense and for regional security. That would require revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which bars Japan from waging war. Yet surveys show that 60 percent of the public support Article 9 - and 73 percent support the U.S. security treaty.
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Frustration with the ambiguities of the U.S.-Japan relationship is growing on both sides of the Pacific. In elections to the upper house on July 11, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's Liberal Democratic Party saw its strength fall from 64 seats to 49. Doubts about Japan's role in Iraq contributed to the LDP's poor showing.
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For the past year I have been teaching U.S. foreign policy in Tokyo. When I ask my students what America means for them, a consistent picture emerges. They deeply admire the United States for its sense of freedom and opportunity and for its ethnic pluralism - features they feel are absent from Japanese society. At the same time, they are profoundly disturbed by the role of violence in American society.
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These young people are generally satisfied with Japan's pacifist constitution. They have little understanding of the nature of war and its role in international affairs; war is as distant from their lives as the samurai dramas on TV.
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On the other hand, many of the students see Japan as isolated and vulnerable. They are concerned about the threat posed by North Korea, and about the dependency of Japan on foreign imports, especially oil. They see the world as a rather frightening place, and regard the United States as Japan's only reliable ally and protector. So to a surprising extent their commitment to a pacifist Japan dovetails with their perception of U.S. military ardor.
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This division of labor cannot last indefinitely. Both sides need to look for a new configuration for the relationship - one that will not be exclusively bilateral, but will include ties with other Asian nations.
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Some may look to Europe as a model. The cold war left Europe united and able to look forward to a future without war (outside the Balkans). The main threat is radical Islamic terrorism. The security landscape in Asia, however, is quite different. The collapse of the Soviet Union did remove the principal military threat to Japan and the main reason for the security treaty with the United States. But Asia has not yet moved beyond the cold war, since there are still four Communist states in the region (China, North Korea, Vietnam and Laos).
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The economic dynamism of the region means that common economic interests now outweigh competing political ideologies. Unfortunately, the U.S. monopoly on Japan's military security prevents Japan from finding a new role in Asia, and traps its foreign policy in the groove of bilateral ties with Washington.
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The fact that Koizumi avoided a more telling defeat on July 11 probably means business as usual in Japan's foreign policy for a few more years. It will require creative leadership to overcome Japan's security dependence on the United States and to shape a new foreign policy. Initiatives in this direction will require understanding and support from Washington. But at this stage the leaders in both capitals seem more comfortable affirming the status quo than exploring new approaches.
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Peter Rutland is a professor of government at Wesleyan University in Connecticut, and currently a visiting Fulbright lecturer at Sophia University and Kyoritsu Women's University in Tokyo.



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